Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 37 | Number 2

Article 7

1-1-1997

Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential
Information: What Does a California Lawyer Need
to Know?
Joseph S. Stuart

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Joseph S. Stuart, Comment, Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Information: What Does a California Lawyer Need to Know?, 37 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 547 (1997).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE OF
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION:
WHAT DOES A CALIFORNIA LAWYER NEED TO
KNOW?

I.

INTRODUCTION

A lawyer's nightmare. You are standing at the fax
machine, watching your highly confidential document finish
scanning through the machine, when you think to yourself:
"Did I dial the right fax number?"
This is just one of the infinite scenarios where innocent,
inadvertent acts can lead to disclosure of confidential information to opposing parties. Inadvertent disclosure can involve simple human error, like above, or high-tech glitches.
It could also involve document production so voluminous that
it is both humanly and technologically impossible to safeguard against all inadvertent disclosure. 1 New technology
and increased litigation complexity can exacerbate the
problem.2
Case law is not clear as to the effect inadvertent disclosure of confidential information could have on litigation.3 Is
inadvertently disclosed information still protected by either
the work-product or the attorney-client privilege? Can unintentional acts by an attorney ever imply a waiver of the client's privilege? If so, when?
The background section of this comment considers three
influences on the current state of the law: (1) the sparse California case law on point; (2) the federal case law, emphasizing
the Ninth Circuit; and, (3) the views held by the American
Bar Association.4 The analysis section discusses how the current law can be applied to guide a California attorney when
1. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp.,
573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978) (deeming inadvertent disclosure inevitable in production of 17 million pages of documents). See also discussion infra Part
II.B.l.a.
2. For example, the advent of fax machine technology created a new way

to make these kinds of errors.
3. See discussion infra Part II.
4. See discussion infra Part II.
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he or she inadvertently sends or receives confidential documents. This comment then proposes that the courts more
clearly establish what is legally expected of an ethical attorney who sends or receives inadvertently disclosed information.6 Greater emphasis should be placed on the importance
of the attorney-client privilege and on professionalism in general. The courts ought not tolerate the willful exploitation of
opposing counsel's clerical error.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

California Courts
1. The Kanter Case

Only one California court decision has involved a fully
inadvertent disclosure of attorney-client privileged information.7 In Kanter v. Superior Court,8 Mr. Kanter sued Safeco
Insurance Co. and its attorney, Gerald Edelstein, claiming
that officers of Safeco and Edelstein conspired to commit bad
faith insurance practices.9
Kanter's attorney subpoenaed Edelstein's non-privileged
files regarding the underlying litigation-which Kanter had
won-because he was now trying to collect on the judgment.10
Edelstein forwarded his entire file to the attorney who represented both Safeco and himself.'1 The attorney claimed to
have dutifully segregated the file into privileged and nonprivileged documents. 12 The documents were forwarded to
the attorney's copying service with instructions that, "privi5. See discussion infra Part III. Even in federal court an attorney might
need to be aware of California law on this issue, because state law applies in
federal court when litigating attorney-client privilege in diversity actions. See
FED. R. EVID. 501.

6. See discussion infra Part IV.
7.

The case law deals primarily with confidential information that is pro-

tected by the attorney-client privilege. However, confidential information that
isprotected by the work product doctrine is treated the same way. See Transamerica Computer Co., 573 F.2d at 647 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978); Hartford Fire Ins.

Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 328 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
8. 253 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1988). Although the opinion has been
depublished, it is the only case with facts directly on point with this comment
and the case offers insight as to how the court views inadvertent disclosures of
privileged information.
9. Id. at 811.

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 811-12.
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leged docs. (yellow pages) are to be kept in our office; remaining copies are to be sent to opposing14 counsel."1 3 The copies
were delivered to Kanter's attorney.
Of the approximately 1600 documents delivered to
Kanter's attorney, about 160 documents were later identified
as privileged. 15 Edelstein's attorney declared, "[a]t no time
did I intend to produce any privileged documents," and the
"legal file would not have been produced but for my mistake
and clerical error in my office."' 6 In response to questions
posed at a deposition regarding the documents, he objected
and asserted the attorney-client privilege.' 7 A motion for a
protective order was filed, asserting that the production was
inadvertent, the documents were still privileged, and no
questions regarding them could legitimately be posed.' 8
The trial court granted the protective order, requiring
Kanter's counsel to return the documents, destroy copies and
other documents produced using the privileged information,
and not to discuss, refer to, or question a party about the
was vacated by the apprivileged documents.1 9 That decision
20
pellate court on a peremptory writ.
In vacating the trial court's decision, the appellate court
considered whether inadvertent conduct by an attorney can
ever imply a waiver by the client of the attorney-client privilege, and if so, when.21 The court held that "[i]nadvertent
production, like voluntary testimony about privileged communications, evidences an intent inconsistent with the continued assertion of the privilege."2 2 Thus, the attorney's inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents "could waive
[the] privilege and... [the errant party] ha[s] the burden of
proving that the privilege had not been waived."2 3
The court, in essence, re-framed the issue by requiring
the holder of the privilege (i.e., the client) to convince the
court that the attorney's error did not imply a waiver of the
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 812.
Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
Id. at 813.
Id.
Id. at 815.
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privilege.24 The court summarily rejected the argument that
only the client, as holder of the privilege, could waive the
privilege.25 The court also summarily rejected the contention
that inadvertence is the antithesis of purposefully relinquishing a privilege; that is, that it could imply an intent to
waive.26
To rationalize placing the burden upon the errant party,
the court borrowed from federal case law.27 The court compiled six factors in order to decide whether the facts surrounding the inadvertent disclosure supported the errant
party's assertion that a privilege remained intact. 28 The
court considered: (1) the reasonableness of the precautions
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; (2) the time required
to rectify the error; (3) the scope of the disclosure; (4) the extent of the disclosure; (5) the issue of fairness and protection
of the privilege balanced against how carefully or negligently
the privilege was guarded; and, (6) the existence of special
circumstances, such as accelerated or compelled discovery.29
The court then applied the factors to the situation before
it. The precautions were not reasonably designed to protect
the confidentiality of the documents:3 0 Edelstein did not seg31
regate the privileged from the non-privileged documents;
the attorney forwarded both to the copier, although only the
non-privileged were to be copied; he did not check the work of
the copier;3 2 and, the privileged documents were found unsegregated and not in any orderly fashion, regardless of the
attorney's assertion that he had separated them.33 The time
required to rectify the error was great: The defendants did
not discover the error themselves, and, ultimately, the documents were in plaintiffs hands for fifteen months before de24. Id. at 814, 819.
25. Id. at 814.
26. Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
27. Id. at 815 (citing Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981)); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean
Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub non, Sea Land
Serv., Inc. v. United States, 444 U.S. 915 (1979).
28. Kanter,253 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19 (citing Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
29. Id. at 819.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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fendants moved for a protective order. 34 The scope of the disclosure was wide: 10% of all the documents and 35% percent
of the correspondence turned out to be privileged, too many to
support an intent to maintain confidentiality. 35 The extent of
the disclosure was total; the plaintiff had fifteen months to
examine the documents.3 6 The court stated that fairness demanded that since the defendant committed the error, he
should bear the burden of showing that waiver should not
have been found.3
Additionally, the plaintiff could not realistically expunge
his mind and his case of the documents after fifteen months,
i.e., "unring[ ] the bell."38 Lastly, no extraordinary circumstances surrounded the nature of the discovery and subpoena
process. 39 After analyzing the six factors above, the Kanter
court found Edelstein was entitled to no relief from4 0 the
waiver implied by his attorney's inadvertent disclosure.
Because the attorney-client privilege was deemed
waived, the trial court's protective order was vacated. The
receiver of the inadvertently disclosed information was free
to use it against the sender at trial.4 1
2.

Other Cases

The California courts have had other opportunities to
consider whether an attorney receiving privileged information may use it to his or her advantage. These cases are not
precisely on point because the privileged information was not
disclosed by inadvertent, accidental conduct. However, a
brief look at how the courts view the receiving attorney is
nonetheless helpful.
a. Cooke v. Superior Court
In Cooke v. Superior Court,42 involving a marital dissolution, a butler eavesdropped on privileged communications be34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
Id.
147 Cal. Rptr. 915 (Ct. App. 1978).
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tween Mr. Cooke and his attorney.43 The butler forwarded
the privileged information he overheard to Mrs. Cooke, who
gave it to her attorney." Mr. Cooke's motion for a protective
order was successful; the use of the information was prohibited and Mrs. Cooke's attorney was disqualified from participating in the litigation because he had been exposed to the
privileged information.45
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the
information was still privileged and refused to allow the use
of the information in the litigation.46 This outcome logically
favored the aggrieved party more than in Kanter, since the
disclosure involved some surreptitious conduct, rather than
mere inadvertence.
However, the court of appeal ruled the attorney disqualification by the trial court was not warranted. 47 The receiving
attorney should not have been disqualified because of mere
"exposure" to privileged information, with the exception of if
such exposure occurred because the attorney had previously
represented Mr. Cooke. 48 49Here, Mr. Cooke was never a client
of Mrs. Cooke's attorney.
b. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity
Insurance
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Insurance5 0 also dealt with an attorney improperly receiving privileged information. 51 Aerojet's attorney received a privileged
memo drafted by opposing counsel, discussing his opinion of a
particular witness.52 This occurred because the memo had
fallen into the hands of an
employee of Aerojet, who for53
warded it to that attorney.
Aerojet's attorney, knowing the privileged nature of the
memo, used it and did not share the news that he had received the memo with opposing counsel, or even his own col43. Id. at 917.
44. Id.
45. Id.

46. Id. at 918.
47. Id. at 921.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Cooke, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
Id.
22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 863.
Id.

Id.
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leagues. 54 The attorney deposed the previously unknown
witness, held the memo in his office, and allowed routine of55
fice cleaning to destroy the memo months later. The insurance company's attorney eventually became suspicious, and
ultimately Aerojet's attorney disclosed how he got the memo
and that it had been destroyed.5 6 A sanction order was issued to Aerojet's attorney for failing to advise opposing coun57
sel of receipt of the privileged document on a timely basis.
58
The court deemed the conduct unethical and in bad faith.
for all costs
The order held the attorney's firm responsible
59
testifying.
from
witness
the
precluded
and
On appeal, the court addressed the issue of whether the
inadvertent receipt of privileged, confidential communication
60 The court indicreates a duty for the receiving attorney.
cated that "[t]here is no State Bar rule of professional conduct, no rule of court nor any statute specifically addressing
this situation and mandating or defining any duty under such
circumstances." 6 1 The court adamantly stated that Aerojet's
attorney was free from any wrong-doing and reversed the
trial court's sanction order, 62 since there was no duty to disclose in a timely manner. The attorney did nothing the court
could deem as frivolous or delaying, thus making sanctions
improper. 6 3 The issue of whether the privileged information
by the fact
was properly excluded from the trial was6 mooted
4
regardless.
trial
at
prevailed
Aerojet
that
c.

McGinty v. Superior Court

65
Unlike the Aerojet case, in McGinty v. Superior Court,
the attorney receiving unsolicited information did not use it
knowing it was privileged.6 6 As such, the court reasoned that
sanctions against the attorney were even more improper

54. Id. at 864.
55. Id. at 863-64.
56. Aerojet-General Corp., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 864.
Id.
Id. at 864-65.
Id. at 865.
Id.
Aerojet-General Corp., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865.

63. Id. at 866-67.
64. Id. at 866.

65. 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 292 (Ct. App. 1994).
66. Id. at 294.
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since no willful use of confidential information was involved.6 7 Unlike Aerojet, the McGinty court addressed the issue of whether exclusion of the privileged information was
proper, because the outcome of the trial had not rendered the
issue moot.68 The court held that to exclude the information

would be improper. 9 They reasoned that to do so would be
an unfair windfall to the defendant and would severely undermine the plaintiffs case. Furthermore, all the information at issue was likely to have been legitimately discovered. 70 The court also stated that the avowed purpose of
discovery sanctions is remedial, not punitive, as the lower
1
7
court had used them.

Perhaps coincidentally, each of the foregoing California
cases did not condemn a lawyer who benefited from an exploited clerical error or surreptitious discovery of privileged
information.
B.

Federal Courts

The federal courts spawn considerably more cases on this
issue than California courts. Opinion significantly differs as
to the effect of an inadvertent disclosure of privileged
information.
1. The Ninth Circuit
a. Transamerica Computer Co. v. International
Business Machines Corp.
In 1978, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a situation that epitomizes modern litigation involving voluminous document
production. In Transamerica Computer Co. v. International
Business Machines Corp.,72 IBM was required, pursuant to
an accelerated discovery order, to review 17 million pages of
its documents to ensure no privileged documents were included in the delivery to opposing counsel. 73 Despite herculean precautions to separate the privileged documents, IBM
67. Id. at 298.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 293.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 297.
McGinty, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 297.
573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 648.
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inadvertently turned over approximately 5800 pages of privileged communications.7 4
The court sidestepped the issue of whether inadvertent
disclosure could have waived the privilege by finding that the
circumstances under which IBM was required to produce documents made the production of privileged documents inevitable. 75 The trial court had imposed an extremely rigorous
schedule of accelerated discovery for voluminous documents.7 6 This "de facto" compelled IBM to produce privileged
documents without "adequate enough opportunity to claim
[the privilege]."7 7 Where IBM was thus compelled to produce
privileged documents, compliance did not waive the privilege. 78 The court limited it holding to the "truly exceptional
and ... unique" circumstances of this case.79
b.

Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research and
Management

Three years later, the Ninth Circuit considered more directly whether inadvertent disclosure could waive a privilege.
In Weil v. Investment /Indicators, Research and Management, 80 the court revealed its views on whether inadvertence
could imply waiver, stating that "the subjective intent of the
party asserting the privilege is only one factor to be considered in determining whether waiver should be implied."8 "
The court flatly stated that "'inadvertence' of disclosure does
not as a matter of law prevent the occurrence of waiver. "82
74. Id. at 650.
75. Id. at 650-52. Thus the facts of this case are on point but the holding
does not address whether attorney inadvertence can waive the privilege.
76. Id. at 651.
77. Id.
78. TransamericaComputer, 573 F.2d at 651.
79. Id. The circumstances of the trial itself were also unique in that the
trial judge, as part of the accelerated discovery, ruled that "errors were bound
to result," so privilege would be preserved as long as the party continued to
"employ reasonable screening techniques." Id. at 650. This was a prophylactic
ruling made by the trial judge to safeguard the privilege during this extraordinary discovery process. Id. This is an important narrowing of the factual setting of this case along with the accelerated discovery process, that seems to be
ignored in virtually all subsequent application of the case found in this
comment.
80. 647 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1981).
81. Id. at 24.
82. Id.
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c. United States v. Zolin
Six years later, in 1987, the Ninth Circuit applied Transamerica and Weil to a case involving purely accidental, inadvertent disclosure in a non-voluminous discovery setting. In
United States v. Zolin,8 3 a secretary sent what were thought
to be blank audio tapes to an opposing party, but they in fact
contained privileged communications. 8 4 The court said that,
like IBM in Transamerica,the privilege holder was deprived
of "[adequate] opportunity to claim the privilege" and, therefore, held there was no waiver. 5 Whereas voluntary disclosure waives a privilege, 8 6 "[t]he secretary's delivery of the
tapes... was sufficiently involuntary and inadvertent as to
be inconsistent with a theory of waiver."8 7 Oddly, the court
allowed the ordinary secretarial error to usher in the same
anti-waiver protection that the extraordinary circumstances
8
The court
of accelerated discovery did in Transamerica."
that indiWeil
case
of
the
made no mention of the portion
cated inadvertent disclosure (e.g., secretarial error) could
possibly imply a waiver of the privilege.
d.

United States v. De La Jara

In the most recent Ninth Circuit case of United States v.
De La Jara,9 the court reasserted that portion of Weil that
stated that the circumstances surrounding the inadvertent
disclosure of privileged information must be considered9 ° and
that certain circumstances could imply a waiver even when
disclosure is inadvertent. 9 The court borrowed, and greatly
broadened, the prophylactic rule fashioned by the trial judge
in Transamerica which heretofore only applied in the extraordinary circumstances of voluminous, accelerated discovery.9 2 The De La Jara court held that "the privilege [is] pre83. 809 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987), affd in partand vacated in part,491 U.S.
554 (1989).
84. Id. at 1417.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1415, 1417.
87. Id. at 1417.
88. Id.
89. 973 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1992).
90. Id. at 749 (citing Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Bus.
Machs. Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 1978)); Zolin, 809 F.2d at 1415.
91. De La Jara, 973 F.2d at 749-50 (citing Weil v. Investment/Indicators,
Research and Management, 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981)).
92. Id. at 750.
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served if the privilege holder has made efforts 'reasonably
designed' to protect and preserve the privilege... [and] conversely,... [that] the privilege. ..[is] waived if the privilege

holder fails to pursue all reasonable means of preserving the
confidentiality of the privileged matter."93 Thus, in De La
Jara,the fact that the party failed to take steps to recover the
inadvertently disclosed document or to protect its confidentiality until six months had passed, "allowed the mantle of confidentiality which once protected the documents to be irretrievably breached, thereby waiving his privilege." 94
The Ninth Circuit cases offer seemingly divergent rules.
Zolin indicates that inadvertent, accidental disclosure of
privileged information by an attorney's secretary deprives the
holder of the opportunity to assert the privilege, and therefore constitutes no waiver. 95 De La Jara indicates that the
holder of the privilege must demonstrate that reasonable
steps were taken to assert and preserve the privilege, if he or
she is to stave off the waiver implied by the inadvertent
disclosure. 96
2.

Other Circuit and District Courts

Other circuit court opinions add considerable confusion
to the issue of inadvertent disclosure. The District of Columbia Circuit credits the attorney-client privilege the least and
is quickest to find waiver. 9 7 The In re Sealed Case98 indicates

that the privilege is only as intact as the holder makes it.99
The privilege is waived by disclosure, even wholly inadvertent disclosure. 100
[11f a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it must treat
the confidentiality of attorney-client communications like
jewels - if not crown jewels. Short of court-compelled
disclosure, or equally extraordinary circumstances [as in
Transamerica],we will not distinguish between various
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation and quotation omitted).
Zolin, 809 F.2d at 1417.
De La Jara, 973 F.2d at 750.
See generally infra Part II.B.2.
877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 980.
Id.
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degrees of 'voluntariness' in waivers of the attorney-client
privilege. 10 1

This is consistent with the same circuit court's opinion ten
years earlier in In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean
Transportation,10 2 where "[an intent [of the holder] to waive
10 3
one's privilege is not necessary for such a waiver to occur."
As recently as 1994, district courts in the District of Columbia Circuit have upheld this harsh but easy to apply approach. 10 4 Thus, one is at the mercy of the attorney's precautions so long as the attorney "acted within the scope of
authority conferred" upon him.105
Outside of the District of Columbia, the circuits have
given the attorney-client privilege more weight, but in varying degrees.'0 6 The opposite view of the D.C. Circuit is best
summarized in the district court opinion of Mendenhall v.
Barber-Greene Co.'0 7 Though it is a district court opinion, it
has been widely discussed throughout the circuits.10 8 Mendenhall points out that the terms "inadvertent waiver" are
oxymoronic:
We are taught from first year law school that waiver imports the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right.' Inadvertent production is the antithesis of
that concept .... [Ihf we are serious about the attorneyclient privilege and its relation to the client's welfare, we
101. Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
102. 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom, Sea Land Serv., Inc.
v. United States, 444 U.S. 915 (1979).
103. Id. at 675.
104. See In re United Mine Workers of Am. Employee Benefit Plans Litig.,
156 F.R.D. 507 (D.D.C. 1994).

105. Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d at 675.
106. See generally infra Part II.B.2.
107. 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 582 (1994).
108. Mendenhall provides a nice pivoting point to illustrate the disagreement among the circuit's respective district courts. See Berg Elecs., Inc. v.
Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1995) (agreeing with Mendenhall); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(citing Mendenhall); Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Del.
1990) (holding that Mendenhall was a better reasoned rule); Kansas-Nebraska
Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12 (D. Neb. 1984) (agreeing
with Mendenhall). But see FDIC v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252 (D. Me. 1992) (holding that inadvertent disclosure is always a waiver); In re Sause Brothers Ocean
Towing, 144 F.R.D. 111 (D. Or. 1991) (adopting the "circumstances" five factor
test); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (adopting the "circumstances" five factor test); Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National
Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (disagreeing with Mendenhall).
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should require more than such negligence by counsel
before the client can be deemed to have given up the
privilege. 10 9
In addition, the Mendenhall court determined that "flor
this Court [waiver leads to] ... harsh results out of all proportion to the mistake of inadvertent disclosure.'1 0
The Third and Eleventh Circuits have not considered
Mendenhall, but their district courts have followed it as recently as 1995.111 The Eighth Circuit felt no need to address
those district courts which have followed Mendenhall, when
presented with the opportunity to do so in 1993.112
Not surprisingly, the modern trend in the federal courts
3
has been to adopt a middle ground. Rather than always 1 or
1 14
inadvertent disclosure will waive the privilege
never,
sometimes." 5 The First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits have found implied waiver of the attorney-client
privilege when information has been inadvertently disclosed
in certain circumstances.' 1 6 As recently as 1995, the First
Circuit held in Texaco Puerto Rico v. Department of Consumer
Affairs,1 1 7 that "[i]t is apodictic that inadvertent disclosure
18
This
may work a waiver of the attorney-client privilege."
109. Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955.

110. Id. at n.8.
111. See Berg Elecs., 875 F. Supp. at 261; Georgetown Manor, Inc., 753 F.

Supp. at 936; Helman, 728 F. Supp. at 1099. However, a recent split among the
district courts of the Third Circuit has developed. For example, in February of
1995, the District Court of Delaware elected to adopt the Mendenhall approach.

Berg Elecs., 875 F. Supp. at 263. But at the end of the same year, the District
Court of New Jersey (also in the Third Circuit) expressly eschewed Mendenhall

and adopted the middle ground approach of ad hoc reviewing the circumstances
surrounding the disclosure. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404
(D.N.J. 1995). This further exemplifies how Mendenhall serves as a nice pivot-

ing point for what direction the courts take. See also supra note 108.
112. See Pavlik v. Cargill, Inc., 9 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 1993) (ruling on a case of
inadvertent disclosure, without a hint of dissatisfaction with prior cases in
which their district courts followed Mendenhall).
113. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
114. See, e.g., Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 951.

115. See, e.g., Texaco P. R., Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d
867 (1st Cir. 1995); Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1993);
United States v. De La Jara, 973 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Ryans, 903 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1984).
116. See id.

117. 60 F.3d 867 (1st Cir. 1995).
118. Id. at 883.
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dogmatic statement disregards those circuits that are not in
accord, but reflects the greater weight of case law.
The greater weight of current case law throughout the
circuits shows that, under certain circumstances, inadvertent
disclosure is capable of implying a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 119
3. The "Circumstances"Approach
The cases which follow this trend require a review of the
"circumstances" of the disclosure on a case-by-case basis. 120
The courts, even in the D.C. Circuit, agree that the extraordinary circumstances of the Transamerica case do not constitute a waiver.' 2 ' For the D.C. Circuit these are the only circumstances that would excuse inadvertent disclosure, and
thus waive the privilege. 122 Other courts, however, consider
that other "circumstances" might also excuse inadvertent
23

disclosure.1

A widely accepted form of assessing whether the "circumstances" indicate that the privilege was not waived, is the five
factor test. 124 A court considers: (1) the reasonableness of the
precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; (2) the
time required to rectify the error; (3) the scope of the disclosure, (4) the extent of the disclosure; and (5) the issue of fairness and protection of the privilege balanced against how
carefully or negligently the privilege was guarded. 125 Importantly, courts will make a presumption of waiver, placing the
burden on the holder of the privilege to convince the court the
privilege has not already been waived by the inadvertent
disclosure.'

26

119. See cases cited supra note 115.
120. See cases cited supra note 115.
121. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
122. Id. at 980.
123. See cases cited supra note 115.
124. See, e.g., Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1993);
Cunningham v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins., 845 F. Supp. 1403 (S.D. Cal.
1994); Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626 (W.D.N.Y. 1993); Eureka
Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179 (E.D. Cal.
1991); FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Va.
1991); In re Sause Bros Ocean Towing, 144 F.R.D. 111 (D. Or. 1991); Bud Antle,
Inc. v. Grow-Tech Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Lois Sportswear v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey,
109 F.R.D. 323 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
125. See cases cited supra note 124.
126. See cases cited supra note 124.
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For example, a recent Fifth Circuit case involved a defendant who inadvertently produced one privileged cassette
tape among twenty non-privileged tapes. 12 7 In applying the
five factors, the court concluded:
[The defendant] had not taken reasonable and available
precautions to protect the materials from disclosure, that
the scope of the discovery was limited such that the [defendant] could reasonably have discovered any privileged
materials and that the disclosure was complete since
[plaintiff] had become aware of the full contents of the
tapes. Nevertheless,... other considerations outweighed
those factors and favored a finding that there had been no
waiver. The [defendant] had immediately asserted the attorney client privilege upon learning of the disclosure and
considerations of fairness counseled in favor of ordering
the materials returned. The tapes were clearly privileged
and would not have been discoverable absent a waiver
the disclosure of the tapes was obviously
and furthermore,
128
inadvertent.
In adopting the five factor approach, the Fifth Circuit redisclosure either never,
jected the cases that said inadvertent
12 9
privilege.
the
waived
or always,
In our view, an analysis which permits the court to consider the circumstances surrounding a disclosure on a
case-by-case basis is preferable to a per se rule of waiver.
This analysis serves the purpose of the attorney client
privilege, the protection of communications which the client fully intended would remain confidential, yet at the
same time will not relieve those claiming the privilege of
the consequences of their carelessness if the circumdemonstances surrounding the disclosure do not clearly
30
strate that continued protection is warranted. 1
The approach of analyzing the "circumstances" has received some criticism as being too arbitrary and yielding diverse outcomes. 131 Outcomes in these cases are subject not
127. Alldread, 988 F.2d 1425.

Id. at 1433-34 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1434.
Id.
See, e.g., In re United Mine Workers of Am. Employee Benefit Plans
156 F.R.D. 507, 511-12 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (indicating that interpreting
"circumstances" presents "practical difficulties"); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d
976 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (preferring a rule of waiver rather than "distinguishing
128.
129.
130.
131.
Litig.,

between various degrees of 'voluntariness.'").
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only to the "circumstances" of the inadvertent disclosure, but
with regard to the law
also to the court's personal 1paradigm
32
of attorney-client privilege.

C. American Bar Association
The California Rules of Professional Conduct and the
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not specifically address these unusual inadvertent
disclosure and waiver situations. 133 The American Bar Association ("ABA") expressed its views by issuing formal opinions addressing the question of what the receiving and sending attorneys should do when confidential information is
issued
inadvertently disclosed. Two Formal Ethics Opinions
134
by the ABA are highly relevant to this comment.
1. Formal Opinion 92-368
ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 indicates that an attorney
who receives inadvertently sent confidential information
should refrain from examining the information, notify the
sender (assuming he or she is ignorant as to his or her errant
transmittal), and abide by the sending attorney's instructions. 135 The opinion concludes that the importance of "poto the
tentially competing principles ... pales in comparison
36
confidentiality."'
importance of maintaining

The opinion disagrees with the law in the D.C. Circuit
that inadvertent disclosure destroys confidentiality and
waives the attorney-client privilege. 137 The ABA states that
"[t]he fact that [the D.C. Circuit's] result is reached is not surprising if one starts with hostility to the privilege ....

[T]he

Model Rules certainly reflect a far more positive view toward
132. As this comment will bear out, the District of Columbia's hostility toward the privilege results in virtually a per se finding of a waiver, regardless of
the circumstances.
133. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368
(1992) (stating that the rules offer no explicit guidance on this issue).
134. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368
(1992); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382
(1994).
135. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368
(1992).
136. Id.
137. Id. See also In re United Mine Workers of Am. Employee Benefit Plans
Litig., 156 F.R.D. 507, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (responding to the ABA's criticism
and reluctantly declining to follow the ABA opinion).
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the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of attorneyclient communications.' 38
The opinion agrees with case law requiring "something
more" than a mere inadvertent mistake before a waiver is
found. 13 9 Specifically, the opinion agrees with the five factor
approach discussed above as a means of exploring whether a
waiver should be implied. 140 The opinion intimates that its
view is palatable and not extreme, since some courts followa
ing Mendenhall have gone even further by insisting that
141
waiver can never be implied from unintended conduct.
Lastly, the opinion gives weight to a consideration rarely
found in the case law: Professionalism. 142 "[T]he ... professionalism inherent in doing the43 right thing can ...only [accrue] to the lawyer's benefit."'
2.

Formal Opinion 94-382

A second ABA Formal Opinion addresses situations
where an attorney receives confidential information, not sent
inadvertently, but gained surreptitiously.1 4 4 ABA Formal
Opinion 94-382 adopts a rule similar to ABA Formal Opinion
92-368, but more flexible in nature. 14 1 When a lawyer is offered or sent materials from an unauthorized party that the
lawyer determines are privileged, the lawyer should refrain
from reviewing the materials any more than is necessary to
determine how to proceed. 1 46 The lawyer should then notify
the adverse party or lawyer and follow their instructions, or
ask the court for a ruling on the disposition of the materials.147 The receiving lawyer may be entitled to use the
materials if the unauthorized sender is rectifying improper
conduct, such as disclosing documents that were being improperly withheld by the adverse party. 48 The opinion fore138.
(1992).
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
(1994).
145.
146.
147.
148.

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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warns that this situation could give rise to an accusation that
the materials were not unsolicited by the receiving lawyer,
and thus become a basis for disqualifying the receiving lawyer due to possession of an opponent's confidential
information. 149
The opinion specifically agrees with the district court
case of In re Shell Oil Refinery,150 where an employee disclosed confidential documents of his employer to opposing
counsel."5 ' That case required the receiving lawyer to return,
and refrain from making use of, all confidential documents,
preservation of the "integrity of this juciting concern for the
52
1

dicial proceeding."

The opinion notes several state bar opinions that disais free to use the
gree and conclude the receiving 1lawyer
53
materials to his or her advantage.
The ABA's opinions on inadvertent disclosure of privileged information made a rare appearance in a district court
case in 1994. In Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of America
Bank,'5 4 the defendant's attorney inadvertently sent an obviously privileged document to plaintiffs counsel.1 55 The court
agreed with the ABA's reasoning that the importance of confidentiality and professional ethics dictate that the error
should not imply a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
The court stated:
In this Court's judgment, common sense and a high sensitivity toward ethics and the importance of attorney-client
confidentiality and privilege should have immediately
caused the plaintiffs attorney to notify defendant's counsel of his office's mistake. While lawyers have an obligation to vigorously advocate the positions of their clients,
this does not include the obligation to take advantage of a
149. Id.
150. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382
(1994) (citing In re Shell Oil Refinery, 143 F.R.D. 105 (E.D. La. 1992), amended
and reconsidered on other grounds, 144 F.R.D. 73 (E.D. La. 1992)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Maryland Bar Ass'n Op. 53 (1989); Virginia Bar Ass'n Op.
1076 (1988); Michigan Bar Ass'n Op. CI-970 (1983)). Recall that the Aerojet
court in California allowed the receiving lawyer to willfully use the document
without even informing the opposing party that he had the privileged documents. See supra Part II.A.2.
154. 868 F. Supp. 217 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
155. Id. at 218.
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clerical mistake in opposing counsel's office where something so important as the attorney-client privilege is
involved.156
3.

CaliforniaBar Association

There are no formal opinions from the California Bar Association that are on point. However, given that the ABA
view is dictated largely by an emphasis on the importance of
client confidentiality, an attorney in California would likely
face a similar stance from the California Bar, since California
emphasizes confidentiality a great deal. Specifically, a California lawyer "shall not violate his or her duty of protecting
all confidential information as provided in [the] Business and
Professions Code." 157 The California Business and Professions Code requires attorneys to "maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the
secrets, of his or her client."5l ' This great importance placed
upon the client's confidentiality would likely support a similar perspective as the ABA, and a general reluctance to find
waiver of confidentiality from inadvertent disclosure.
D.

Summary

It is apparent that there is a lack of concurrence as to the
effect of inadvertent disclosure of confidential information.
In California, there is clear guidance on this issue from the
Kanter case. 15 9 The divergent rulings in the federal courts
60
point out the complexity of the issue.1 The American Bar
Association attempts to clear the air with bright-line rules
based upon ethical concerns. In the next section, all of the
foregoing shall be applied to a hypothetical situation in order
to show the range of consequences in the various
jurisdictions.

III.

ANALYSIS

You have just realized you mistakenly sent or received
confidential information to or from opposing counsel-what
happens now? With the infinite factual variations under
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 220 (citation omitted).
CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West Supp.

See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
See discussion supra Part II.B.

Rule 3-600(B) (1996).
1996) (emphasis added).
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which one can acquire confidential information, it is difficult
to give a clear answer. However, as a focal point for analysis,
this comment shall consider the following hypothetical that is
not unlikely in everyday litigation.
A. Hypothetical
Attorney Alex writes a four page letter to a client outlining the strengths and weaknesses of the client's case. The
letter is labeled in bold letters at the top: "Confidential. Attorney-Client Privileged." The client is 3000 miles away on
vacation. Alex hands the letter to a secretary and asks to
have it sent to co-counsel Chris for review. The secretary
mails the letter to opposing counsel Otto, by mistake. Otto
reads the letter and intends to use the information to his client's advantage. Alex discovers the error five days later
when Chris calls and asks Alex why the letter has not been
sent.
The federal courts' response to this simple hypothetical is
not clear. The California state courts offer clearer, but troublesome, guidelines.
B.

CaliforniaLaw
As previously stated, the Kanter case is the only case di16 1
rectly on point that involved purely mistaken disclosure.
Did the actions of Alex's office imply that the client waived
the privilege of having vital communications kept in confidence, when the client was 3000 miles away on vacation?
The answer is yes, unless Alex can persuade the court not to
find a waiver by arguing the six Kanter factors. 162 The client
must show that Alex's "[i]nadvertent production.., evidences
an intent inconsistent with the continued assertion of the
privilege." 63 Alex must file a motion for a protective order,
seeking return of the document, forbidding fruits of the document, and also asking for a disqualification of opposing counsel as he or she is tainted by the confidential information. 161
161. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
162. Kanter v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819-20 (Ct. App. 1988).
The Kanter court's six factors are essentially the same as the five factor analysis. However, the six factor analysis adds one factor for considering special circumstances, such as in the Transamericacase where voluminous document production was deemed to have been compelled by the court. Id.
163. Id. at 814.
164. These are the typical remedial measures sought in such cases.
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Alex must show the circumstances are such that the inadvertent production should not imply a waiver.' 65
1. First Factor
The first factor asks, did Alex take adequate precautions
to protect the confidentiality of the documents? 166 Here Alex
properly and boldly labeled the document confidential and
privileged. Even a recipient who is not a trained lawyer
would instantly be on notice that the document is private and
confidential. The fact that the document is a letter addressed
to someone besides the recipient, rather than a generic document, further bolsters the argument that the receiver would
be on notice that the transmittal was errant.
Alex could point out that the secretary's mistake was understandable, since both the intended and unintended recipients were attorneys and were both involved in the case. The
error is more excusable and understandable given the fact it
was made in responding to a request to send the document to
someone other than the addressee. Any training Alex had
given the secretary on handling confidential documents
would help Alex's argument. Any other precautions taken
with the outgoing mail or faxes should also be brought to the
court's attention.

16 7

The court could consider that simple communication errors between co-counsels are not difficult to prevent and that
the information should have been in memo form addressed
specifically to co-counsel to reduce potential errors. However,
Alex should be successful in characterizing these precautions
as appropriate for any prudent lawyer's practice, and the inadvertent disclosure as impossible to prevent with total
certainty.
165. Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
166. Id. at 819.
167. The issue of labeling documents with warnings of confidentiality is becoming murky. In the abstract, such bold labeling blatantly puts the receiver
on notice that the document is confidential. But a wide spread reaction by law
firms of blanketly labeling nearly all documents in this manner dilutes the effect of the warning. The use of these warnings has become so commonplace
that they appear on fast food lunch order faxes! See Abdon M. Pallasch, Fax
Cover Sheets Carry Dire Warnings for Law and Lasagna, 18 CHI. LAw. 14
(1995). If an attorney who received confidential information can show the
sender has a practice of indiscriminatelylabeling documents with confidentiality warnings, then the errant sender may get little credit for such a precaution
from the court. Id.
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2. Second Factor
The second factor asks, did Alex take too much time to
rectify the error? 168 Alex moved for a protective order as soon
as the error was discovered. It would have been helpful if
Alex's own efforts or safeguards revealed the error. Alex
might be successful in characterizing his response as immediate under the circumstances, clearly inconsistent with
waiver. The error occurred merely five days before the efforts
to rectify the error began.
3. Third and Fourth Factors
The third and fourth factors consider the scope and extent of the inadvertent disclosure. 169 Since only one document is involved, the disclosure is total. The disclosure cannot be characterized as a needle in a haystack of documents,
nor a minor, yet privileged, piece of information. In five days
time it is likely the recipient has learned everything from the
four page document, unlike the argument that could be made
with a four hundred page document. Alex will have difficulty
characterizing this factor as inconsistent with waiver.
4. Fifth Factor
1 70
Factor five is concerned with fairness to the parties.
Alex can argue that the effect of finding waiver due to a common, innocent mistake such as this creates an unfair windfall
for opposing counsel. Nonetheless, the court will presume
that it is fair for Alex to bear the "burden of dealing with the
ramifications of the error, not [opposing counsel] ."171 The "information gleaned from the documents has saturated [opposing] counsel's mind; thereby, presenting the old dilemma of
'unringing the bell.' 1

72

This is especially true here since the

information the opponent now has (Alex's legal strategies,
impressions, and opinions) can play an important role in virtually every aspect of the opponent's strategy, and cannot
fairly be removed from the opponent's consciousness. Short
of disclosure of the "smoking-gun," this is the worst type of
disclosure for Alex.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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5. Sixth Factor
The sixth factor looks at whether there are special cir73
cumstances involved that make waiver inappropriate.
Alex has nothing to offer here. There is not the court compelled or accelerated discovery, nor ultra voluminous production which has swayed courts in the past. Alex was not responding to any discovery-he sent out the document of his
own impetus.
6.

Conclusion in California

Alex will likely be unsuccessful at stopping the opposing
counsel from keeping the document and using its contents.
The Kanter court was not persuaded to grant relief from
waiver in a factual setting that was an equally innocent and
garden-variety error, but in a much more voluminous document setting. 174 Alex only had to protect one extremely confidential letter, but failed.
Opposing counsel Otto will not be in any legal jeopardy
for actions that might seem despicable to a layperson. He
never had an obligation to point out his fellow bar member's
error, nor to refrain from taking full advantage of the clerical
error. It is well settled in California under the Cooke, Aerojet,
and McGinty cases, that the passive receiver of confidential
capitalize on
information may willfully and surreptitiously
75
the opponent's information leak. 1

The client is lost in the shuffle. How can a client be
deemed to have waived the precious attorney-client privilege,
that belongs to him or her personally, while merely vacationing 3000 miles away? Under Kanter, the privilege is gone.
The inadvertence of the attorney will be ascribed to the clithe client
ent. 176 Since the attorney acts as the client's agent,
1 77
authority.
of
exercise
the
about
cannot complain
173. Id.
174. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
175. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
176. Kanter,253 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15 (citing Carroll v. Abbott Lab., Inc., 654
P.2d 775 (Cal. 1982)).
177. Id. at 815 (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604
F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom, Sea Land Serv., Inc. v.
United States, 444 U.S. 915 (1979)).
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C. FederalLaw
1. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit is riddled with district court rulings
that, similar to the Kanter case, presume waiver unless the
six circumstances surrounding the error support nonwaiver. 17

Undoubtedly, Alex would be faced with making

the same arguments as above. However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has sent confusing signals to the
district courts. The Zolin case is notably similar to the Alex
hypothetical. Recall that in Zolin, a secretary sent tapes mistakenly containing confidential information, rather than the
intended blank tapes.' 79 The court summarily indicated the
secretary's conduct "was sufficiently involuntary and inadvertent as to be inconsistent with a theory of waiver,"18 0
although the court found waiver on other grounds.' 8 ' Alex
can make a compelling argument that the factual similarities
involving a secretarial error make Zolin controlling, requiring a finding of no implied waiver.'8 2
The district courts have found ways around Zolin in order to find a waiver. In the case of In re Sause Brothers
Ocean Towing,'13 the district court rationalized the higher

court's ruling in Zolin on secretary error as "a brief discussion
that did not detail the surrounding circumstances... [and] of
limited precedential value ...[because] it did not concern a
production of documents in discovery."18 4 The district court

went on to note that the Zolin court ultimately found waiver
on other grounds in a "more expansive discussion appearing
earlier in its opinion. " '8 5 These distinctions do not undermine Zolin's applicability in Alex's case.
178. The cases speak of this in terms of "five factors" plus one "special circumstances" factor from the Transamericacase. See generally, Cunningham v.
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins., 845 F. Supp. 1403 (S.D. Cal. 1994); In re Sause Bros.
Ocean Towing, 144 F.R.D. 111 (D. Or. 1991); Eureka Fin. Corp. v. Hartford
Accident and Indem. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179 (E.D. Cal. 1991); Bud Antle, Inc. v.
Grow-Tech Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
179. United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987), affd in part
and vacated in part, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1415.
182. Id. at 1417.
183. 144 F.R.D. 111 (D. Or. 1991).
184. Id. at 115.
185. Id.
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In the Alex hypo, opposing counsel Otto can characterize
Zolin's finding of no waiver as a conclusory, off-hand, sub-ruling that pales in comparison the Ninth Circuit's other
lengthy, seriously considered, analogous rulings that do find
waiver. True, both the Weil and De La Jara cases did state,
with more attentive, detailed analysis than Zolin, that inadvertent disclosure can create a waiver. 1

6

However, these

not as factually on point with the hypo as the Zolin
cases 18are
7
case.

Otto can also deflate the Zolin case because of its reliance
on the Transamerica case. 188 The Zolin court cites from
Transamericathat no waiver occurs if the holder has "no opportunity to claim the privilege." 89 The Transamericacase
is distinguishable. In Transamerica, IBM's lack of opportunity to claim waiver was because of an extraordinary, voluminous, accelerated discovery circumstance, not because of a
secretary's mistake. 90 The Transamerica court deemed it
impossible for IBM to avoid inadvertent mistakes, and thus
191
impossible to have all opportunity to claim the privilege.
Therefore, Otto could argue that Zolin's use of Transamerica,
and Alex's use of Zolin, is flawed.
However, Alex's argument analogizing to Zolin still
seems impervious given the distinct similarity of facts. Of
course, there is the concern that the Ninth Circuit could disavow that portion of their ruling in Zolin. If the Zolin argument fails, Alex will still be faced with the opportunity to argue the six factor test. As stated above, this would likely be
unsuccessful.

186. See, e.g., Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research and Management,
647 F.2d 18, 23-25 (9th Cir. 1981) (using three pages of analysis to decide inadvertence can waive privilege, versus the one-paragraph discussion in Zolin
flatly stating that inadvertence is inconsistent with waiver).
187. Recall that the Weil and De La Jara cases did not involve an innocent
office clerk error at all. See Weil, 647 F.2d at 18; United States v. De La Jara,
973 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1992).
188. United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987), affd in part
and vacated in part, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) (citing Transamerica Computer Co. v.
International Bus. Machs. Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978)).
189. Id.
190. Transamerica,573 F.2d at 650-51.
191. Id.
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2. Other Circuits
In the other circuits, Alex must be prepared to argue the
six factor test, given its prevalence in district courts throughout the country. 192 This argument is detailed in the Califor193
nia Kanter case analysis above.

In some jurisdictions, notably the District of Columbia
Circuit, Alex will be faced with a per se waiver created by his
secretary's mistake. 194 In these jurisdictions, inadvertent
disclosure always waives the attorney-client privilege for the
disclosed information, thus no analysis is necessary. Otto
will enjoy this jurisdiction; the client however, while 3000
miles away, will be stripped of the privilege without recourse.
Yet in other circuits, Alex can argue that it is impossible,
illogical, and unfair for his secretary's mistake to indicate the
client waived the attorney-client privilege by implication.
Citing Mendenhall and other supporting cases,1 95 Alex can
argue "[i]nadvertent production is the antithesis of [the] concept [of waiver]," which would generate "harsh results out of
all proportion to the mistake." 196 The facts show the secretary's mistake was the epitome of inadvertence, and in no
way reflected the desires of the client. Granting a waiver
would result in grave harm to the client, in that the information disclosed to the opposing counsel was the attorney's complete analysis of the pending case. In these jurisdictions,
Alex would be successful in staving off a waiver of his client's
attorney-client privilege.
3. American Bar Association
As stated above, there are no California Bar Association
rules to apply to these situations. If the American Bar Association's stance is adopted, Alex could file a complaint against
opposing counsel Otto. Otto willfully disregarded ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 when he failed to notify Alex that he had
received Alex's errant transmittal. Had Otto called, he would
192. See supra note 115.

193. See discussion supra Part III.B.
194. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
195. See, e.g., Berg Elecs., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1995);
Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Fla. 1991);
Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Del. 1990); Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12 (D. Neb. 1984).
196. Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill.
1982), cert. denied., 115 S. Ct. 582 (1994).
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also have been obligated to follow Alex's instructions with regard to rectifying the error.
Otto has no argument that he did not know the document
was privileged or sent in error. The letter was not addressed
to Otto, and it was clearly labeled as confidential in a manner
either a layperson or an attorney would notice and understand. Further, when Otto read the letter (also in violation of
the ABA opinion), the contents would clearly appear confidential and privileged in nature. Otto's actions are directly
in conflict with the ABA's required actions, respect of confidentiality and professionalism. 197 The ABA can discipline
Otto, but obviously cannot affect the legal aspects of the situation, nor the rights of the client.
IV. PROPOSAL

A. The Relative Importance of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Given the infinite number of factual settings under
which inadvertent disclosure of information can occur, it is
impractical to suggest a uniform solution. Although it is not
possible to anticipate the factual settings, it is feasible to address the principles a judge may bring to bear on future decisions. Future cases will continue to turn not just on the facts,
but on the court's personal view of overriding concerns such
as truth seeking, the adversarial system, the client's interests, attorney carelessness, and hopefully, professionalism.
For example, many courts show hostility toward the attorney-client privilege because "[it] 'impedes [the] full and
free discovery of the truth."198 Accordingly the privilege is to
be strictly confined within the "narrowest possible limits."' 99
The privilege is "not as sacred as a constitutional right" and
does not require a "knowing and intelligent waiver."20

These

courts are much more likely to find waiver of the privilege.
How important is the attorney-client privilege? The answer is subject to debate. "It appears that we may have a
197. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368
(1992).
198. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research and Management, 647 F.2d 18, 24
(9th Cir. 1981)).
199. Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation, United States, 599 F.2d 1224,
1235 (3d Cir. 1979)).
200. Kanter v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Rptr. 810, 814 (Ct. App. 1988).
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conflict here between two eminent authorities, i.e., Wigmore
on the one hand and McCormick on the other."20

1

Wigmore

says the privilege's benefits are "'indirect and speculative"'
and its obstruction is "'plain and concrete.' "202 Conversely,
McCormick notes that the privilege "'protect[s] . . .[impor-

causes only "'incidentant] interests and relationships"'20 and
3
tal sacrifice[s]' to fact gathering."

Thus, the core disagreement among the cases is the issue
of the relative importance of the attorney-client privilege.
The privilege's importance should no longer be a question of a
judge's subjective beliefs, which has created the array of law
on this issue. Where inadvertent disclosure has occurred,
and whevever practical, the scales ought to be tipped in favor
of upholding the privilege.
B.

Current Law

Unfortunately, the weight of case authority dictates that
inadvertent disclosure automatically implies a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege, unless the circumstances warrant
relief from that implied waiver.20 4 This comment proposes
that the exact opposite be the rule. Clerical errors should not
imply that the client has waived the privilege, unless the circumstances warrant implying a waiver. There is ample justification for this new rule: professionalism.
A layperson would likely be surprised to learn that
courts often waive an unsuspecting client's privilege, thereby
entitling a lawyer to willfully exploit a clerical error by using
the privileged information. The Attorney Alex hypothetical
highlighted the plight of the client in this scenario. Should
an innocent clerical error legally eviscerate the client's confidentiality and his or her entire case when other options exist?
No, but it can happen.
201. Farm Credit Bank v. Huether, 454 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 1990) (nicely outlining the divergent views of the privilege).
202. Id. at 721 (quoting Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 813).
203. Id. (quoting Sterling v. Keidan, 412 N.W.2d 255, 259-60 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987)).
204. See, e.g., Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d
867 (1st Cir. 1995); Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1993);
United States v. De La Jara, 973 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Ryans, 903 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1984).
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The cases discuss the privilege largely as an evidence issue with little focus on the ethical implications. 20 5 As indi-

cated above, the ABA has tried to shift the analysis to include
issues of professionalism and concern for the client's confidentiality when inadvertent disclosure occurs. The courts
ought to support this view in the future. The ABA correctly
views inadvertent disclosure not as an issue of one client in
one case, but rather as an opportunity to show how the legal
profession views its clients in general.
Professor Monroe Freedman, a distinguished expert on
this issue, disagrees. Professor Freedman indicates the adversarial system makes it improper and illogical to suggest
that an attorney have any concern for the opponent's attorney-client privilege.20 6 The professor disparages efforts in
the name of "professionalism" as a "current vogue."20 7
However, Professor Freedman discounts what is at stake
when a profession endorses the exploitation of clerical errors.
It is common knowledge, and requires no citation to a source,
that the legal profession is not viewed as the pinnacle of professionalism by society today. Time Magazine refers to a con20 8
cern with "a growing cynicism toward the law itself." Pop-

ularity in general may not be important, but the profession's
service to society is certainly more important than the strict
adherence to the adversarial rules to which Professor Freedman refers. Unwavering respect for clients' confidences, even
those of the opposing counsel's client, and uniform judicial
treatment not tolerating willful exploitation of a clerical error
in a court of law, will better serve the adversarial system and
society. A working standard of what is legally expected from
an ethical lawyer who inadvertently sends or receives privileged information would ease the current ad hoc application.
C. Future Law
This comment's proposal to reverse the presumption, and
find no waiver from inadvertent disclosure will, of course,
need to be tempered with issues of practicality. Indeed, some
205. Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of Am. Bank, 868 F. Supp. 217, 220
(W.D. Mich. 1994).
206. Monroe Freedman, The ErrantFax, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at 26.
207. Id.
208. Robert J. Samuelson, After Lawyer Bashing, TIME MAG., Jan. 15, 1996,
at 47 (emphasis added).
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circumstances will warrant finding a waiver where the
sender is reckless, the receiver could not have been aware the
information was privileged, and the disclosure cannot be undone. It is difficult to "unring the bell" and place the parties
back in the position they were in before the inadvertent disclosure. 20 9 However, these situations that mature past the

point of practical remedy would be minimized if attorneys
were required to behave ethically early on, and required to
bear the risk if they do not.
For example, if you receive documents inadvertently sent
to you, return them. The inadvertence may be yours next
time. If you are approached by a third party with confidential
information, refuse to accept it and notify the opposing party,
and the court, if foul-play is suspected. If an attorney willfully contaminates him or herself with privileged information, the courts should not hesitate to disqualify that attorney. If an attorney is unwittingly contaminated with
privileged information that is clearly not otherwise discoverable, a protective order should issue, disallowing the use of the
information. If the inadvertent sender is reckless, opposing
counsel should report it to the Bar, instead of punishing the
errant attorney and client on his or her own.
These proposals may sound simplistic to a veteran of
high stakes litigation. The benefits of making the right ethical choice may pale in comparison to the immediate benefits
of making the choice based upon evidentiary considerations.
However, the long term benefits of making the right ethical
choices are great, but often not apparent. Aside from the benefits of having a clearer understanding of what is required of
the attorney and bolstering the professional nature of the
practice of law, the ABA accurately states that, "[there is]
credibility and professionalism inherent in doing the right
thing.

''2 10

V.

CONCLUSION

Clerical errors are inevitable, and as document processing technology advances, the opportunities for error will increase. When an attorney, or an attorney's staff, inadvertently discloses information protected by the attorney-client
209. Kanter v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Rptr. 810, 820 (Ct. App. 1988).
210. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368
(1992).
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privilege, some courts indicate there is an implication that
the client has waived the privilege since the information is no
longer secret. In these jurisdictions, the opposing party is
free to exploit the clerical error. This denigration of the attorney-client privilege is countered by courts at the other extreme that indicate it is illogical to imply any intention from
inadvertent, unintended conduct. Most courts approach the
issue somewhere in-between these extremes.
At the heart of the issue of whether inadvertent disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege is the relative importance courts place on the privilege at the outset. Currently, most courts that do not follow the above extremes will
automatically presume a waiver has occurred, and then review the circumstances to determine if that presumption is
invalid.
The exact opposite should be the rule. The courts should
presume a waiver has not been implied by the clerical error,
unless the circumstances warrant implying waiver. Rather
than presuming a waiver has been implied, the courts should
presume a hostility toward attorneys who willfully exploit
clerical errors. The current disarray of case law would become more orderly if the courts uniformly attached a more
heightened importance to client confidentiality when reviewing the facts surrounding the inadvertent disclosure in the
name of professionalism.
Although attorneys are in an adversarial setting and are
required to zealously represent their client, the profession as
a whole has responsibilities to behave ethically and with integrity. The need for this is heightened when, as now, society
is skeptical of the legal profession. The ABA implores attorneys not to take advantage of opposing counsel's clerical errors and stresses the importance of client confidentiality and
legal professionalism.
The courts should follow suit, and uniformly recognize
that inadvertent disclosure does not waive the protection of
the attorney-client privilege, unless the party wishing to
pierce the privilege justifies a contrary ruling.
Joseph S. Stuart

